Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

U.S. Supreme Court (2002)

This opinion is safely relied on only when the dispute arises at the threshold, pre-arbitration stage and resistance is framed solely as a procedural objection to a forum-specific eligibility or time-limit rule analogous to waiver or delay, rather than as a challenge to contract formation, consent, or substantive arbitrability. The Court’s reasoning supports allocating application of the NASD six-year time-limit rule to the arbitrator only insofar as the issue concerns who decides a procedural eligibility question under a federal arbitrability framework. It does not resolve the substantive meaning or application of the time bar, whether such rules define arbitral consent or jurisdiction, what contractual language would reassign the issue to courts, how choice-of-law provisions affect allocation, or how the analysis changes after arbitration has proceeded. Reliance on Howsam beyond this narrow decision-allocation context risks over-extension into consent, merits, state-law, or post-award review questions the Court expressly left open.